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Commentary: The Federalization of Nonprofit
Regulation and Its Discontents
James J. Fishman'
INTRODUCTION
W E live in an age where charitable organizations are under increasingfederal regulatory scrutiny. The Internal Revenue Service (the
"Service"), at the instigation of the Senate Finance committee-the
Service's primary congressional overseer-has commenced a corporate
governance initiative by issuing announcements and guidelines, as well as
providing educational advice as to how charities' internal affairs should be
ordered. The Service also has revised the Form 990 Annual Information
Return, a publicly available document, so that it contains mandatory
corporate governance questions. Nonprofit organizations traditionally
have been creatures of state law and overseen by state agencies and
regulators.' What is unique about the corporate governance initiative is the
Service's admission that it lacks express statutory authority for this effort.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN
REGULATION OF CHARITIES
Until the twentieth century, the federal government had no interest
in the regulation of charities. The introduction of the federal income tax
changed that. Charities have been granted preferential federal tax status
under the Internal Revenue Code since the Revenue Act of 1894.4 The
automatic nature of obtaining tax exemption and the deductibility of
I Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. 0 201I James J. Fishman.
2 See IRS FORM 990 (2oo), Part VI.
3 This issue is developed in James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS's Nonprofit
Corporate Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAx REV. 545, 548 (2oo).
4 Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509,556. This statute was declared uncon-
stitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 6oi, 637 (1895), because it was a
direct tax not apportioned according to a state's population. The Sixteenth Amendment cured
this objection by allowing individuals' incomes to be taxed without regard to each state's
population. There was a personal tax in the Revenue Act of 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292,
309, but it was never implemented. The Revenue Act of 1862, ch. I19, § 90, 12 Stat. 432,473
imposed an income tax to finance the Civil War. The Corporation Excise Tax Act of 19o9
contained an exemption for charities in language that parrots most of the modern §501(c)(3).
See Corporation Excise Tax Act of 19o9, ch. 6, § 38,36 Stat. 11, 113.
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contributions initially encouraged this lack of federal oversight.' Federal
tax law relating to nonprofits has not evolved consistently, but has resulted
from politics, policies, and responses to abuses of tax-exempt status brought
to Congress's attention.
Marion Fremont-Smith has identified three stages in the federal
development of charity regulation.' In the first, which lasted roughly
until the 1940s, broad definitional parameters were established as to the
boundaries of charity status. This enabled donors to deduct charitable
contributions to certain nonprofits from their own tax liability. This stage
generally relied upon self-policing to assure accountability.' A primary
catalyst of federal scrutiny was the private foundation, which raised
suspicions as far back as 1914.8
Private foundations were equal opportunity offenders. To those on
the right, they promoted controversial activities such as civil rights and
voter registration in favor of discriminated and disenfranchised minorities.
The left believed foundations protected the affluent, shielded large pools
of wealth from taxation, and possessed a shadowy behind-the-scenes
influence. Periodic abuses were publicized in the press and taken up by
5
The essence of the advantage of [the coordinate privileges of tax
exemption and deductibility] is that it is automatic. The government
does not control the flow of funds to the various organizations; the re-
ceipts of each organization are determined by the values and the choic-
es of private givers. The donors determine the direction of their own
funds, and the distribution of "tax savings" as well. The income of each
individual organization is a product of donations it receives and the in-
vestment wisdom of its managers. Since all of these operations are out of
the hands of government under the exemption and deduction statutes,
the beneficiary organizations receive their governmental aid without
having to petition for it.
Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and
Underlying Policy, in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY
AND PUB. NEEDS 2025, 2039 (1977), available at http://www/eric.ed.gov/PDFS/EDI436o6.pdf
(papers compiled by Department of the Treasury).
6 MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE
LAW AND REGULATION 300 (2004).
7 Id.
8 In 1914 the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, known as the Walsh
Commission, learned that the Rockefeller Foundation was to study industrial relations and-
fearing a whitewash-in turn studied Rockefeller. Two years later, it published a report which
claimed that the concentration of wealth in large foundations was used by industrial magnates
to control leading universities. The majority of the Commission recommended federal char-
tering of all "nonprofit organizations with more than one function and funds of more than
$1 million," as well as federally imposed limitations on size, accumulation of unexpended
income, and duration. It also called for strict supervisory procedures. Nothing came of these
proposals. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 6, at 68 (citing COMM'N ON INDUS. RELATIONS, INDUS.




The second stage marked the creation of a border between exempt and
nonexempt organizations. During the 1940s, Congress became concerned
that individuals were using tax-exempt organizations to shelter or avoid
taxable income' and reacted to these perceived abuses with the Revenue
Act of 1950. This legislation added sections to the Internal Revenue
Code that taxed the unrelated business income of most tax-exempt
organizations" and denied exemption to feeder corporations by providing
that an organization primarily engaged in a trade or business for profit
did not qualify for exemption merely because its profits were destined
for charitable ends. 2 Another provision prohibited certain charities from
accumulating unreasonable income in such a manner that would jeopardize
the carrying out of the charity's exempt purposes." Also, some charities
would lose their exemptions if they entered into certain kinds of self-
dealing transactions or granted excessive compensation." The last two
limitations applied only to charitable organizations, which would later be
defined as private foundations." Public charities were exempted from
these restrictions because they were viewed as less susceptible to abuses.'"
This period introduced procedures for applying for recognition
of tax-exempt status and filing an annual information return. Prior to
1950, the Service's initial focus on charities was at the front end-i.e.,
assessing whether an existing. organization that caught its attention met
9 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 6, at 67-68; JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ,
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 7 ,2- 7 15 (4th ed. 20o); Laurens Williams & Donald V. Moorehead,
An Analysis of the Federal Tax Distinctions Between Public and Private Charitable Organizations, in
4 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUB. NEEDS,
supra note 5, at 2099, 2101-02.
o In 1948, the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce investigated the
economic situation of the textile industry in New Hampshire and came across the operations
of Royal Little, president of Textron, Inc., who used private foundations to finance Textron
business ventures. The investigation and Little's transactions are discussed in Comment, The
Modern Philanthropic Foundation: A Critique and a Proposal, 59 YALE L.J. 477, 492-97 (1950).
II I.R.C. H§ 512-14 (2oo6) (codified by Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301(a), 64 Stat.
906, 947-50).
I2 I.R.C. § 502 (2oo6) (codified by Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301(b), 64 Stat. 906,
953).
13 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 6, at 60.
14 I.R.C. § 503 (2011) (codified by Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301(a), 64 Stat. 906,
947-50). The House Ways and Means Committee had wanted to prohibit self-dealing com-
pletely, but the Senate Finance Committee and the combined Conference Committee weak-
ened the provision to require arms-length standards. Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private
Foundation Lar: Historical Perspective on Its Origins and Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REV. 52, 53-54 (2000).




the requirements for tax-exempt status." It was not until 1954 that a
purportedly exempt organization had to obtain a determination from the
Service that it was entitled to that status, though with the exception of
churches, almost all organizations that relied on contributions did obtain
such a ruling from the Service.'"
In 1942, the Treasury Department required all tax-exempt organizations
to file an annual information return, a two-page form that covered the
1941 tax year and consisted of three questions, an income statement, and
a balance sheet. 9 Some organizations protested, so the next year the
Treasury Department sought statutory authority from Congress to seek
financial information from charities.o Congress required certain exempt
organizations, principally foundations, to file returns that would disclose
their financial affairs.2 ' No one could have imagined from such a modest
beginning that Form 990 would exponentially expand in page-length
and importance to become the principal disclosure tool for government
oversight of exempt organizations.22
In the third phase came an expansion in the Service's regulatory
function. Again private foundations were the catalysts for Congressional
action. The result was the adoption in 1969 of a complicated enforcement
regime by which private foundations and their managers were regulated
more strictly than public charities.2 1 Sections 4940 to 4945 were added
to the Internal Revenue Code and imposed a sliding scale of excise taxes
(depending. upon the offending foundation's willingness to correct its
wrong) for abuses in which Congress felt private foundations were most
likely to engage. The excise tax in the first instance of a violation replaced
the draconian penalty of revocation of exempt status, the only previous
17 Cf Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
18 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 6, at 61. In 1954, Department of the Treasury made fil-
ing an exemption mandatory, for which the organization received a determination letter that
recognized its exemption. Treas. Reg. § I.5o(c)(3)-I(b)(6) (2009).
19 Treasury's authority to impose this requirement was contested and compliance was
poor. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 6, at 65.
20 Id. at 59, 65.
21 Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235, § 117, 58 Stat. 21,37 (1944). Excluded from
this filing requirement were churches and other religious organizations, certain educational
institutions, and certain publicly supported organizations. One purpose of the 1943 legislation
was to provide Congress with sufficient information to determine if further legislative restric-
ions were needed. Williams & Moorehead,supra note 9, at 2101.
22 The form has continually been revised to contain more information. All private foun-
dations and most other § 501(c)(3) charities' annual reports are online with GuideStar. Seegen-
erally GUIDESTAn, http://www2.guidestar.org/Home.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 20 11). FREMONT-
SMITH, supra note 6, at 65-67, tracks the changes in the form.
23 This is a dauntingly complex area of the law. The description here does not do it
justice. For elementary overviews, see FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 6, at 264-85; FISHMAN &
SCHwARZ, supra note 9, at 672-99. For more technical analysis, see BRUCE R. HOPKINS & JODY
BLAZEK, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS: TAX LAW AND COMPLIANCE (3d ed. 2oo8 & Supp. 201O).
802 [Vol. 99
DISCONTENTS
remedy. In 1987, the excise tax approach to regulatory violations migrated
to the public charity sector to curb lobbying abuses and political activity.24
A fourth phase of federal oversight has now emerged where federal
fiduciary norms of behavior have been applied to all §. 501(c)(3) charities,
effectively replacing the primacy of state law. This stage began in 1996
with the enactment of the so-called intermediate sanctions legislation that
imposed an excise tax on "excess benefit transaction[s]" by "disqualified
person[s],"-insiders who received excessive compensation." This use of
the excise tax approach to penalize excess benefit transactions in public
charities differed from its use to punish violations of the lobbying and
political restrictions. Previously, Congress had not addressed the setting
of compensation, an area primarily governed by state nonprofit law. The
intrusion of federal regulations into areas historically reserved for state
governance and oversight expanded significantly with the Service's
corporate governance initiative. The four papers commented upon herein
examine aspects of this development.
II. THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
Professor Johnny Rex Buckles's paper, The Federalization of the Duty of
Loyalty Governing Charity Fiduciaries,26 offers a creative and rich analysis of
its subject matter. He develops an interesting categorization of conflict
of interest standards in the federal tax regime: supra-trustee, trustee, and
nonprofit-corporate-director.7 The three standards address very different
problems. The affected organizations, in a sense, inhabit alternative
universes within this enormous grouping called the nonprofit sector.
A conundrum with the federalization of the duty of loyalty is that it
blends different issues and problems and upsets the federal/state balance.
The federal government and the states have different fish to fry. States
historically are more attuned to organizations' mission attainment. This
is the reason for the relaxation of nonprofit corporate requirements for
conflicts of interest. The federal concern is with the proper use of foregone
tax revenues.28
State fiduciary standards are appropriate throughout much of the
nonprofit sector, but state enforcement mechanisms and resources are
24 I.R.C. H§ 4912,4955 (2oo6).
25 I.R.C. § 4958 (West Supp. 20I0).
26 Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalization of the Duty of Loyalty Governing Charity
Fiduciaries, 99 Ky. L.J. 645 (201 i).
27 Id. at 677.
28 Duty of loyalty violations can extend beyond the prohibition against private inure-
ment, which is a violation dealing with insiders. See Buckles, supra note 26, at 16; see also
United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 E3d i173, I176-77 (7th Cir. 1999) For example, a
non-insider, a low-level employee, may be guilty of disloyalty but not inurement.
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inadequate. The strength of the federal interest in duty of loyalty issues
rests on certain types of organizations where abuses have tended to occur.
For most of the sector, the problems and concerns addressed by Congress
with the corporate governance initiative may not be an issue, or if they are,
no one really knows the extent of the abuses.
Professor Buckles argues that the governmental interest in requiring
substantial fairness in conflict of interest transactions is strong, and that its
interest in requiring procedural fairness is defensible.29 State law, however,
provides adequate requirements of fairness for nonprofit corporations
and trusts for most types of organizations. I disagree that administrative
efficiency is quite so important as Professor Buckles suggests, because the
federalization of standards and their enforcement creates inefficiencies and
costs for nonprofit organizations. I also question the value of uniformity of
loyalty standards. The driving concept of the ALI's Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Organizations-that an organization's legal structure should not
determine the applicable fiduciary standards-initially appealed to me.
However, it may be that in some situations different organizational forms
should have separate standards.
The author speaks of the inconsistencies of most fiduciary standards
except for the nonprofit corporate directors' standard for unaffiliated
public charities.3 0 Congress responds to perceived problems as they
occur. Congress has not considered fiduciary problems in a coherent way.
Its attitudes towards fiduciary duties seem similar to the expansion and
contraction of organizations entitled to exemption under § 501. By contrast,
when the Service acts, it does so consistently across all parts of the sector.
Thus, there is a discrepancy between Congress's approach and that of the
Service in corporate governance. Professor Buckles's paper justifies an
examination by Congress of the inconsistencies he points out in applying
the duty of loyalty to the regulation of nonprofits.
III. CHOKING OUT LOCAL COMMUNITY SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS
Professor Nicole Dandridge has done a real service in pointing out
the size and impact of smaller charitable nonprofits, their importance in
our communities, and the governance initiative's burdens upon them. 31
Despite their numerical superiority, smaller nonprofits tend to be slighted
or given lip service when considering regulation of the sector and the
burden of governance upon these organizations.
Statistical data on smaller nonprofits is very soft. Professor Dandridge
29 Buckles, supra note 26, at 685-87.
30 Id. at 3680-81.
31 Nicole S. Dandridge, Choking Out Local Community Service Organizations: Impact and
Implications of Recent Upsurge in Federal Regulation Imposed Upon Small Community Nonprofit and
Charitable Entities, 99 Ky. L.J. 695 (201).
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presents many interesting facts about this enormous, yet unknown part of
the nonprofit universe. While it may be useful for the Service to obtain
information on smaller organizations in the sector through the new Form
990-N, loss of exemption for failing to file seems a heavy price for small tax-
exempt organizations that are operating yet flying under the Service's radar.
Many may lack the capability of filing electronically, which is the only way
the Service will accept the form. As Professor Dandridge points out, the
result of noncompliance with the seemingly innocuous 990-N will be the
loss of tax exemption by many operating organizations, a devastating event
to the organization in terms of donor relationships and financial viability.
Restoration of exempt status may not be so easy. Professor Dandridge also
points out that the costs to re-file and the complexity of Form 1023 will
create barriers to reentry.32
For organizations filing Form 1023, there are relatively recent
demands for applicants to have certain corporate governance procedures
and practices in place. These practices and procedures appear in Form
1023's questions and raise new expectations for organizations applying
for recognition of tax-exempt status. There is no data to my knowledge
about the extent of fraud in smaller organizations or whether conflicts of
interest policies and board independence are truly helpful in increasing
the probity of smaller nonprofits. Yet, the clear implication of Form 1023
is that organizations should spend substantial amounts of time thinking
about corporate governance procedures. The increased burdens of filling
out Form 1023 make it more likely organizations will have to spend scarce
funds to hire a specialist to assist in completion of the form."
Overregulation of smaller organizations, if not a disincentive to their
full formation, may impact their ability to attract volunteers and their
continuance. As Professor Dandridge points out, smaller nonprofits are
unlikely to have counsel except in cases of emergency or when faced with
perceived Service governance mandates.M Often smaller organizations
believe elaborate governance procedures will make it easier to attract
funding. The focus on procedure necessarily takes away resources and
makes more difficult mission attainment and fundraising.5 The full Form
32 Dandridge, supra note 31, at 721-22.
33 I have very mixed feelings about creating new nonprofits and almost always recom-
mend to people who want to form a new organization to find a fiscal sponsor so the organiza-
tion can use the sponsors' tax exemption. The sponsor can handle books and filing require-
ments until the organization reaches a certain size and indicates viability. I also recommend
to organizers and their counsel, if they have one, GREGORY COLVIN, FiSCAL SPONSORSHIP: 6
WAYS To Do IT RIGHT (2006), an excellent resource for organizations contemplating a fiscal
sponsorship arrangement.
34 Dandridge, supra note 31, at 701-02.
35 An example of this is that an IRS official mentioned in November 2009 that sixty-
six percent of organizations that filed the then new Form 990 were eligible to file the Form
990-EZ. Simon Brown, Most EOs That Filed the New Form 99o Could Have Filed the 99o-EZ,
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990 must be filled out by a specialist, which smaller organizations can
hardly afford. It also must be reviewed by the board of directors.-
I agree with Professor Dandridge's citation to the comment in the
report of the Service's Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Governmental
Entities that "[gleography, size, type of activities the organization engages
in, and the make-up of its leadership must be considered when deciding
which governance practices will be most successful and appropriate for a
nonprofit organization."" Although there has been lip service for this, it
tends to get lost when translated to small organizations.
I thought a very interesting part of the paper was the discussion of
the concepts of responsive regulation and new governance, both of which
present useful frameworks within which to examine and debate these
regulatory issues. The Service was responsive to outside comments in
the redrafting of Form 990, but there was relatively little evidence of
interaction with and concern for smaller nonprofits. The Independent
Sector's Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice," as useful as
they are to larger organizations, may be more burdensome than relevant to
smaller nonprofits. Hopefully, the coming review of Form 1023 will result
in increased participation by small organizations.
Professor Dandridge's suggestion of a restoration of exemption procedure
short of reapplication for organizations that have missed the 990-N deadline
and thereby lost their exemption is an excellent recommendation. The
Service could have a procedure similar to that in effect for churches when
they engage in political activity. If the church says it will discontinue the
activity, the exemption is renewed.3 9 Of course, churches don't have to file
a Form 1023, but a similar procedure could attach to an operating nonprofit
Says IRS Official, 64 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 570 (2oo9). There are several reasons for this: ap-
proximately thirty states accept Form 990 as a substitute for the state annual filing form, but
they may not accept Form 9 9 o-EZ; organizations may file the full Form 990 to impress upon
donors that they are mature and have the recommended level of transparency; filing Form 990
requires paid specialist assistance from accounting firms or consultants who have their own
interest in pushing the filing of the full Form 990.
36 IRS FORM 990, Part VI (201o). The organization is asked to respond 'yes' only if a copy
of the organization's final Form 990, including required schedules, as ultimately filed with
the Service, was provided to each voting member of the governing body of the organization,
whether in paper or electronic form, prior to its filing with the Service. The organization must
also describe in Schedule 0 the process, if any, by which any of the organization's officers,
directors, trustees, board committee members, or management reviewed the prepared Form
990, whether before or after it was filed with the Service, including specifics regarding who
conducted the review, when they conducted it, and the extent of any such review. If no review
was conducted, the organization must so state.
37 Dandridge, supra note 31, at 713.
38 PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, INDEPENDENT SECTOR, PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD
GOVERNANCE AND ETHICAL PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR CHARITIES AND FOUNDATIONS (2007), avail-
able at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/report/principles/principles-guidepdf.
39 See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 E3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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after it files the Form 990-N. I am less certain that the notification to the
states will result in much greater contact than exists at the federal level.'
Professor Dandridge's paper offers a useful framework for dealing with the
difficult issues that affect smaller nonprofits.
IV. FEDERAL REGULATION OF NONPROFIT BOARD INDEPENDENCE: Focus ON
THIRD-PARTY STAKEHOLDERS AS A "MIDDLE PATH"
Professor Benjamin Leff views the problem of federal regulation through
a law and economics prism, a creative and interesting focus. 41 He believes
the government under certain circumstances has a legitimate interest in
charity board independence and develops what seems to be a probable cause
standard of private benefit, whereby third-party stakeholders can assist in
evaluating whether exemption should be conditioned on the existence of
some sort of independent board.42 Both the Service and Professor Leff
place great faith in board independence. Does board independence
have an impact on good governance or organizational probity? Professor
Dana Brakman Reiser has questioned the value of independence in the
nonprofit context.43 Few state jurisdictions require independent members
of a nonprofit Board. The argument that the Service does not require
governance procedures is to favor form over substance." If asChief Justice
John Marshall wrote, "The power to tax involves the power to destroy,"45
the power to grant or withhold recognition of tax exemption is the power to
bully and impose the Service's desired governance structures. Questions
on the Service's forms must be answered, and the Form 990 questions
on corporate governance procedures and conflict of interest policies are
reviewable by donors-a very strong incentive to comply with the Service's
wishes.
What justification is there that independent board members will be
effective as third-party stakeholders? The law gives few rights to third-
party stakeholders. Members and directors can bring suit, although this
rarely happens, but donors cannot. The Service's approach is wishful
thinking. Even with an independent board, independence does not mean
4o Dandridge, supra note 31, at 727.
41 Benjamin Moses Leff, Federal Regulation of Nonprofit Board Independence: Focus on
Third-Party Stakeholders as a "Middle Path" 99 Ky. L.J. 731 (2011).
42 Id. at 780.
43 Dana Brakman Reiser, The Increasing Resemblance ofNonprofitand Business Organizations
Law: Director Independence in the Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM. L. REV. 795, 797-798 (2007).
Professor Brakman Reiser also concludes that director independence makes a relatively lim-
ited contribution in addressing real accountability issues facing nonprofit organizations. Id. at
831-32.
44 Leff, supra note 41, at 733 & n.8, 734 n.io, 737-38 & nn. 23-26, 739 & nn. 29, 32, 740
(discussing and citing relevant IRS statements and publications).
45 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (18i9).
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the individual director will be a monitor or gatekeeper. Daniel Kurtz, a
longtime practitioner in the nonprofit area, has written that "probing
questions by charity board members have been viewed as 'simply
bad manners.""' There is no empirical data to support the view that
independence matters. 47
One has no problem when the Service goes after an organization if there
is definite evidence of private purpose. Certain areas of the sector deserve
more scrutiny than others, credit counseling bureaus for instance. It may
be that an independent board is a proxy for such scrutiny, but to extend
that requirement throughout the sector makes little sense. The Service's
approach-presuming that a nonprofit organization whose founders sit on
its board is likely to confer excess benefits to them or advance their private
interests-is akin to arresting people because they look like troublemakers.
It is uncertain that an independent board would cure that situation. The
risk of private purpose if an organization is dominated by founders may
be a reason to deny exemption to some nonprofits, but surely should not
create a presumption against all. Nor can one overestimate the difficulty
of finding board members, independent or otherwise. A 2007 study by the
Urban Institute found that seventy percent of the organizations surveyed
stated it was difficult to find new board members. Twenty percent said
very difficult.48
The federal emphasis differs from state law, which does not prescribe
specific corporate governance approaches. State law promotes flexibility in
organizational structure, allowing organizations to develop the appropriate
structures and policies most suitable in the board's vision.
The description of the Service's model conflict of interest argument
demonstrates its departure from existing state law.49 Under both New York
law and the Model Act, the transaction described as impermissible could
be approved. Under the typical state conflict of interest statute, there is
a procedure for the organization or the board to review a conflict. The
statutes mandate disclosure. If the procedures are not followed or there is
46 Felicity Barringer, Charity Boards Learn to be Skeptical, N.Y.T'MEs, Apr. 19, 1992, at 1o.
47 Empirical studies of for-profit corporations have shown little correlation between
board independence and increase in firm value. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-
Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231,
233 (2oo2); Kathleen M. Boozang, Does An Independent Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate
GovernanceP, 75 TENN. L. REV. 83, 84 (2007); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance
Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Taleforthe Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 251, 255-57 (2005); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, I14YALE L.J. 1521, 1528-31 (2005). There have been no empirical stud-
ies relating to the impact of good nonprofit governance on mission outcome.
48 FRANcIE OSTROWER, CTR. ON NONPROFITS AND PHILANTHROPY, URBAN INST., NONPROFIT
GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS ON PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM
THE FIRST NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE STUDY I6 (2007).
49 Leff, supra note 41, at 738.
808 [Vol. 99
DISCONTENTS
not a disinterested majority of the board to approve, the only consequence
is that the burden of proof shifts to the board in proving the fairness of the
transaction to the organization at the time it was entered into.so Impliedly,
the Service views conflicts as a bad thing. State nonprofit law proceeds
from a different perspective. Interested transactions are common and
cannot be avoided even if there is full disclosure of them.
Professor Leff's analysis of private letter rulings is very informative and
provides added texture to the debate. Interestingly, he finds that in many
of the adverse determination letters the organization should have been
clearly classified as a private foundation." One can only wonder how many
of the organizations whose applications for exemption were rejected would
have been saved by better lawyering.
Professor Leff states: "organizations with no meaningful independent
stakeholders are low on the state's priority list but high on the federal
government's priority list in both cases because of the lack of independent
stakeholders."" This is a useful distinction but one not made by federal or
state regulators. This is a well-reasoned and provocative paper and any of
my disagreements with the points it makes do not diminish that fact.
V. THE "FEDERALIZATION" PROBLEM AND NONPROFIT SELF-REGULATION:
SOME INITIAL THOUGHTS
Professor Mark Sidel notes two perhaps contradictory trends in the
regulation and self-regulation of the nonprofit sector. First, federalization of
nonprofit regulation is increasing, and second, increased federal regulation
is matched by the development and spread of nonprofit self-regulation.s"
He points out the importance of self-regulation. Without question, self-
regulatory structures are important contributors to the integrity and health
of various parts of the nonprofit sector and beyond. With weaknesses and
lapses in government oversight, self-regulation is indispensable for setting
standards, identifying inappropriate and illegal behavior, reaffirming norms
of behavior, and improving the integrity and efficiency of the nonprofit
sector. However, self-regulation has its limitations.
The National Center on Philanthropy and the Law (NCPL) has
examined self-regulation throughout the nonprofit sector. NCPL's Study
on Models of Self-Regulation in the Nonprofit Sector concluded that "[e]
xpectations ... should remain nuanced. ... If the virtues of self-regulation
are trumpeted with too much enthusiasm, disappointment is inevitable
50 See, N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715(b) (McKinney 2005); MODEL NONPROFIT
CORP. ACT § 8.6o(a) (2008).
51 Leff, supra note 41, at 762-63.
52 Leff, supra note 41, at 780.
53 Mark Sidel, The "Federalization" Problem and Nonprofit Self-Regulation: Some Initial
Thoughts, 99 Ky. L.J. 783, 783-84 (2o 1).
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when scandals eventually occur."' It added that the "most significant
factor contributing to the effectiveness of any self-regulatory model is legal
enforceability of its standards." 5 So, for self-regulation to be effective, it
must be backed by legal sanction or accreditation, which can be revoked
by the accrediting body.
A problem with self-regulation is that there are always outliers,
sometimes in unexpected places. For instance, the land trust community,
mentioned by Professor Sidel as a positive example of the self-regulatory
model,s6 had a serious scandal involving its largest and most established
member, the Nature Conservancy." Professor Sidel also cites the example
of community foundations, where self-regulation seems to work well."
However, there are a limited number of community foundations, somewhat
in excess of seven hundred." They are particularly visible organizations in
their communities, and their boards consist of the local worthies.
The securities area, indeed all financial services, is not such a good
example of the self-regulatory model. As Professor Sidel mentions, the
securities and financial services areas have a long history of self-regulation,
and there is a substantial amount of interchange between self-regulatory
organizations (SROs) and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).60 The success of securities and financial services self-regulation is
mixed. Self-regulation did not stop the financial crisis, and if one examines
the history of the relationship between the SEC and SROs, one finds an
ongoing need for Congress to give the SEC enhanced powers over SROs. 61
Too often self-regulation becomes self-protection.
Self-regulation by industry or organizational type typically reflects the
norms of the more established and larger groups. One of the curious aspects
of the Service's corporate governance initiative is the response of both
Independent Sector and many nonprofits that voluntarily adopted certain
Sarbanes-Oxley principles, even though that statute only applies to public
corporations. This has had a trickle-down effect to smaller organizations
54 NAT'L CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY & THE LAw, STUDY ON MODELS OF SELF-REGULATION
IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 6i (Draft 2005), available at http://wwwi.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/pdfs/
Self%oRegulation%2oFinal%2oReport-o4o3o7updates.pdf.
55 Id
56 Sidel, supra note 53, at 784.
57 See Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nonprofit Land Bank Amasses Billions; Charity
Builds Assets on Corporate Partnerships, WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at Ai; Joe Stephens & David
B. Ottaway, Landing a Big One: Preservation, Private Development, WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at
A9 ; Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Senators Question Conservancy's Practices; End to 'Insider'
and 'Side' Deals by Nonprofit Organizations Is Urged, WASH. PosT, June 8, 2005, at A3.
58 Sidel, supra note 53, at 784.
59 Id.
6o Sidel, supra note 53, at 788-89.
61 See generally Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical
Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 853 (1985).
[Vol. 9981o
DISCONTENTS
with all the burdens it entails. 2
Professor Sidel's discussion of the types and experiments of comparative
self-regulation is particularly enlightening. Our nonprofit sector has much
to learn from other countries. Although the social science literature has
produced interesting work, very little has been published in legal journals.
Professor Sidel has been a major contributor in both venues.' One issue
with adopting some foreign approaches is the question of scale. For
instance, Professor Sidel points out that the Philippines has certified 1000
organizations." There may be more than 1000 art museums in the United
States. Certainly, nonprofit self-regulation should be nurtured, but it is a
complement to effective direct regulation.
CONCLUSION
The issues raised in these four fine papers will be with us for the
foreseeable future. Thanks are owed to Professor Nancy McLaughlin of
the University of Utah Law School and to Dean David Brennen of the
University of Kentucky College of Law for organizing the program on
The Federalization of Nonprofit and Charity Law at the AALS 2011 Annual
Meeting. The extent of the federal regulatory role over nonprofits will be
played out in the coming years. Thanks to the Kentucky Law Journal, these
articles will be part of that discussion.
62 Fishman, supra note 3, at 575-78.
63 See, e.g., Mark Sidel, The Guardians Guarding Themselves: A Comparative Perspective on
Nonprofit Self-Regulation, 8o CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803 (2005); Mary Kay Gugerty, Mark Sidel
& Angela L. Bies, Introduction to Minisymposium, Nonprofit Self-Regulation in Comparative
Perspective-Themes and Debates, 39 NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1027 (zoo), available
at http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/39/6/IO 27; Mark Sidel, The Promise and Limits of Collective
Action for Nonprofit Self-Regulation: Evidence from Asia, 39 NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR
Q 1039 (20 io), available at http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/39/6/io 3 9 .
64 Sidel, supra note 53, at 793.
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